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Abstract—In this paper, we evaluate the performance of
wireless powered communication systems from a physical layer
security perspective. Our aim is to determine under which
conditions the random power availability due to wireless power
transmission using a dedicated power beacon impacts the maxi-
mum secrecy rate, compared to its deterministic counterpart. We
also investigate the effect of line-of-sight condition on the system
performance. Analytical expressions are derived for some specific
scenarios, which are combined with Monte Carlo simulations. We
see that under a moderate line-of-sight condition in the wireless
power transfer link, the secrecy performance is barely affected.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the provision of security in communications
has been focused in software encryption techniques, which
are in continuous development due to the huge evolution of
processors and their computing capabilities [1]. These cryp-
tographic techniques usually rely on upper-layer operation,
being the physical layer usually not taken into consideration.
For the latter case, the pioneering work by Shannon [2] on
communication security from an information-theoretic per-
spective proved that secure communication was attainable re-
gardless of the computing power of malicious eavesdroppers.
However, this work remained as a rather unpractical reference
for decades [3]. This idea, for which the term physical layer
security was later coined, has gained momentum in the last
years in the context of wireless communications [4]. The
random fluctuations inherent to wireless fading channels are
known to enable the secure transmission of information over
a wireless link in the presence of an external eavesdropper.
In a different context, there is a need for extending the
battery lifetimes and reducing operational costs associated
to the deployment of wireless sensor networks that enable
the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm [5]. Wireless power
transfer (WPT) [6, 7] is being considered as a potential
solution to provide remote nodes with the required energy
for operation, by wirelessly conveying energy from dedicated
power beacons. The need for security in IoT applications
opens the door to the use of physical layer techniques in
this WPT scenario. Indeed, some authors have tackled this
problem [8], although its inherent analytical complexity does
not facilitate understanding the interplay between the different
parameters from a system design perspective.
In this paper, we investigate to what extent secure wire-
less communications from a physical layer perspective are
feasible, in the context of wireless powered communications.
Specifically, we consider a wireless communication system on
which a legitimate transmitter harvests energy for its operation
from a remote power beacon, and then uses it to transmit
information to a legitimate receiver, in the presence of an
external eavesdropper that observes the communication. The
outage probability of secrecy capacity and the average secrecy
rate are evaluated, and compared to those of a conventional de-
vice with unlimited battery used for benchmarking purposes.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Reference System Set-up
We first consider a system set-up where a legitimate user
(Alice) wants to communicate with another legitimate user
(Bob) over a wireless fading channel. At the same time, a non-
legitimate user (Eve) is capable of eavesdropping on Alice-
Bob’s transmissions due to the broadcast nature of wireless







Fig. 1. Initial System Set-up
In the figure, P0 is the available power at Alice’s trans-
mitter, which is assumed to be constant, and hB and hE
are in charge of modeling the random effects of multipath
fading over the transmitted signal. Without loss of generality,
we consider normalized fading channel coefficients so that,
E{|hB |2} = E{|hE |2} = 1, where E{·} is the expectation
operator. We also assume that the desired (between Alice and
Bob) and eavesdropped (between Alice and Eve) channels are
independent quasi-static fading channels, (i.e. constant during
the transmission of given codeword, yet independent between
codewords), and that both receivers are affected by additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN).
With these definitions, the instantaneous signal-to-noise










is the average SNR at Bob, dB is the
distance between A and B, α is the path loss exponent and
N0 is the noise power. In the same way, at Eve’s receiver the





|hE |2 = γE |hE |2 (2)




, where dE is the now
the distance between A and E, α is the path-loss exponent, and
N0 is the noise power. For notational simplicity and without
loss of generality, we assume the same values for α and N0 at
both receivers. Because the following analysis will be made as
a function of γB and γE , the effect of the former parameters
as well as the distances between nodes are embedded within
the average SNRs.
B. Wireless Power Transmission Set-up
Let us now consider a modification of the reference system
model in Fig. 1, where now a dedicated power beacon (PB)
is used to convey energy to Alice. As we can see in Fig. 2,
the energy transmission between PB and A is made through a
wireless channel denoted as hP , which is independent of hB










Fig. 2. Wireless power transfer-based system set-up
In Fig. 2, we define PPB as the available power at PB,
and denote as PIN the input power at Alice’s receiver.
The coefficient η is the energy harvesting (EH) conversion
efficiency. For the sake of tractability, we assume a linear EH
model for Alice as in [8]. In this situation, the instantaneous
SNR at Bob and Eve’s receivers are given, respectively, by:
γ′B = γ
′
B |hB |2 |hP |2 , (3)
γ′E = γ
′
E |hE |2 |hP |2 , (4)









where dPB−A denotes the distance between the PB and Alice.
Note that according to (3) and (4), a product channel arises
naturally in the definitions of the instantaneous SNRs. By
inspecting (1), (2), (5) and (6), we see that PPB needs to
be designed in order to provide the same average PO at the
harvester output as in the reference case, in order to ensure
a target average SNR at Bob. This will be the case in our
analysis, i.e. γ′B = γB and γ
′
E = γE with a proper design of
the power beacon transmit power PPB .
III. SECRECY CAPACITY METRICS
A. General definitions
According to Shannon’s definition, channel capacity is the
maximum achievable transmission rate (bits/s) that can be at-
tained, with the condition of being error-free. In the following,
and without loss of generality, we will use capacity definitions
per bandwidth unit, i.e. C = log2 (1 + γ). Similarly, the
secrecy capacity CS is defined as the maximum achievable
transmission rate that can be attained under two conditions:
being error-free for the desired link, and being secure in
the sense of the eavesdropper being unable to decode the
information. With this definition, and in the absence of fading,
we have CS = CB − CE > 0 [4, eq. (4)]:
CS =
 log2(1 + γB)− log2(1 + γE) γB ≥ γE
0 γB < γE
(7)
Inspection of (7) reveals that a secure rate does not exist in
the event that the SNR at Bob is worse than the SNR at Eve.
However, when channel fading comes into play, it is possible
that such condition is met for the instantaneous SNR even
though the average SNR at Bob is lower than the average
SNR at Eve. With this in mind, and depending on whether
Eve’s channel state information is available at Alice or not,
two secrecy metrics are conventionally used to characterize
the physical layer security performance in wireless channels:
the average secrecy capacity (ASC) and the outage probability
of secrecy capacity (OPSC).
The ASC can be obtained (as indicated in [9, eq. (12)]) by
averaging the instantaneous secrecy capacity in (7) over all








where Fγ(·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for
the intended SNRs (γB and γE , respectively).
Similarly, the OPSC is defined as the probability that the
maximum secrecy information rate is less than a required
threshold secrecy information rate Rth, and can be computed
as [11]







fγE (x) dx (9)
where fγ(·) is the probability density function (PDF) of γ.
B. Scenario under analysis
We aim to determine the effect of random power availability
at Alice because of the channel fading at the hP link, using
the above definitions for the secrecy metrics. Because of the
inherent LOS nature of the WPT link, we model the random
fluctuations at hP using the Rician (Rice) distribution [10].
As for the channel fading at the information links hB and
hE , we will use different combinations of the Rician and
Rayleigh distributions in order to encompass LOS and non-
LOS conditions. We will refer to these cases as X-Y , denoting
X the fading distribution for hB and Y the fading distribution
for hE . From (3) and (4), and defining gP = |hP |2, we can
write γ′B = γBgP and γ
′
E = γEgP . Hence, when conditioning
to a specific value of gP , the secrecy metrics are those of the
case of having a deterministic power availability at Alice, only
that the average SNRs at Bob and Eve are now scaled by gP .
Hence, we can solve the set-up in Section II-B by using the
solution of the set-up in Section II-A, and then average over
all possible states of the random variable gP using









where I0(·) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind
and order zero, and KP is the Rician K factor for the WPT
link accounting for the amount of power conveyed through the
LOS component, with respect to the NLOS power. This can be
formally stated as CS = E{CS |gP } for the ASC metric and
Pr {CS ≤ Rth} = E{Pr {CS ≤ Rth} |gP } for the OPSC.
Analytical solutions for the OPSC in the Rayleigh-
Rayleigh, Rayleigh-Rice and Rice-Rayleigh cases are either
available in [4] or can be deduced using the approach in
[11].They are not explicitly shown here for the sake of brevity.
Similarly, the ASC in the Rayleigh-Rayleigh case is also given
in [4]; as for the rest of cases, analytical solutions are very
complicated [9] to be averaged out over (10). Therefore, we
will use the tight asymptotic approximation recently proposed
in [12] in order to approximate the average secrecy capacity
CS as the difference between the average capacities of the
desired and eavesdropper’s links in the high-SNR regime:
CS |↑γB ≈ CB − CE . (11)
With these considerations, we will describe the Rayleigh-
Rayleigh as an example of how the analytical evaluation of
the performance metrics of interest can be carried out when
conditioning to gP . In this situation, we have [4]












with F(x) = log2(e)e
1
xE1(x
−1), and E1(·) is the exponential
integral function [13, eq. 8.211]. Now, replacing γB → γBgP
and also γE → γEgP , the desired performance metrics are
obtained as:




















[F(γBg)−F (γEg)] fgP (g)dg, (16)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
After the definition of the secrecy capacity metrics given
in the previous Section, we now provide numerical results of
their evaluation in several scenarios of interest. Theoretical
expressions have been used to reproduce the secrecy per-
formance metrics in the following figures, and Monte Carlo
simulations have been performed in all instances to double-
check the validity of the theoretical results. We first evaluate
the reference scenario given in Section II-A, in order to
determine the effect of LOS propagation in the desired and
eavesdropper’s links. This will be quantified through the
Rician K parameters denoted as KB and KE , respectively.
When either of these parameters equals zero, that corresponds
to the Rayleigh case, i.e. NLOS scenario.
In Fig. 3, we evaluate the ASC in different scenarios as
KE and KB vary. We consider two different values for
γE = {5, 15} dB to enable a clearer representation of the
ASC curves. The AWGN case is included as a reference.
We see that because of the independent fluctuation of the
wireless links due to fading, it is possible to achieve a














KB = KE = 0
KB = 10, KE = 0
KB = 0, KE = 10
KB = KE = 10
KE = KB = 0
KE = KB = 3
KE = KB = 10
Fig. 3. Average secrecy capacity vs. average SNR at Bob, for different values
of KE , KB and γE . Solid lines correspond to the theoretical exact results
using (8), dashed lines are the asymptotic results using (11) and markers
represent Monte Carlo simulations. AWGN case is included as a reference
(dotted black lines).
non-zero secrecy capacity when γB is lower than γE . We
also see that when γB takes low values (i.e., in the low-
SNR regime), NLOS channels achieve a better secrecy rate
than their LOS counterparts. This is due to the fact that
larger fluctuations associated to NLOS fading cause that the
instantaneous SNR of Bob may be above the instantaneous
SNR of Eve with a higher probability. However, in the high-
SNR regime the situation is just the opposite. In general
terms, LOS channels achieve better secrecy capacities than
their NLOS counterparts. In this situation, and because of
the asymptotic behavior predicted by (11), we see that a
larger secrecy capacity is achieved when the fading severity
is reduced in the desired link (i.e. stronger LOS), and when
the fading severity grows in the eavesdropper’s link (i.e., the
Rayleigh case). We see that the ASC in such case exceeds
that of the AWGN case.
We now evaluate the OPSC in Fig. 4 for different choices
of KB and KE . Parameter values are γE = 5 dB and Rth = 3
bits/s. At first glance, we see that the OPSC mainly depends
on KB , whereas the dependence on KE is of lesser relevance.
For instance, in order to achieve a target OPSC of 10−1, we
need ∆ ≈ 5 dB less for KB = 10 than in the NLOS case
(KB = 0). However, we see that the effect of changing KE
is minor, and practically irrelevant when KB = 0. In the low-
SNR regime, we see than the influence of the fading severity
through parameters KB and KE is reverted, because of the
same reasons indicated when evaluating the ASC in Fig. 3.
Having now determined the effects of KB and KE on the
system performance for the reference case, we now investigate
the effect of the random fluctuation in the WPT link on the
system performance. Fig. 5 compares the performance of the
WPT (solid lines) vs. the baseline case (dashed lines), for
different LOS conditions in the WPT link: NLOS (KP = 0)
and LOS (KP = 10). We see that when a LOS condition
is considered for the WPT link, the performance loss is
negligible compared to the reference case. As the WPT LOS
condition vanishes, the performance loss becomes now evi-























kB = 0, kE = 0
kB = 10, kE = 0
kB = 0, kE = 10
kB = 10, kE = 10
Fig. 4. Outage probability of secrecy capacity, vs. average SNR at Bob, for
different values of KE , KB and γE . Solid lines correspond to the theoretical
results with (9) and markers represent Monte Carlo simulations.




















KB = KE = 0
KB = 10, KE = 0
KB = 0, KE = 10
KB = KE = 10
Fig. 5. Average secrecy capacity vs. average SNR at Bob, for different values
of KE , KB and γE . Solid lines correspond to the asymptotic results using
(16) (i.e. wireless PB), dashed lines are the asymptotic results using (11) (i.e.
no wireless PB). AWGN case is included as a reference (dotted black lines).
dent: e.g., for a target ASC of 3 bits/s, we need approximately
1 dB more of SNR than in the reference case (i.e. without PB).
Monte Carlo simulations are not included in the figure for the
sake of clarity, although the correctness of the results has been
verified. The effect of a LOS WPT link on the OPSC metric is
also negligible as observed in Fig. 6. In fact, the distribution
of the WPT channel becomes almost irrelevant when KB = 0.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the impact of the random fluctuations and
the LOS condition in a wireless power transfer set-up with
physical layer security constraints. Results show that as long
as the wireless power link has strong LOS, the impact on
the system performance is limited, and especially in those
cases on which the legitimate link is NLOS. Future extensions
of this work will quantify the impact of non-linear energy
harvesting on the physical layer security.
























KP = 0, KB = 0, KE = 0
KP = 0, KB = 10, KE = 0
KP = 0, KB = 0, KE = 10
KP = 10, KB = 0, KE = 0
KP = 10, KB = 10, KE = 0
KP = 10, KB = 0, KE = 10
Fig. 6. Outage probability of secrecy capacity, vs. average SNR at Bob,
for different values of KE , KB and γE . Solid (KP = 10) and dashed
(KP = 0) lines correspond to the theoretical results after averaging (9) with
(10) (i.e. wireless PB), dashdotted lines are obtained from (9) (i.e. no PB),
and markers represent Monte Carlo simulations for the wireless PB case.
Rth = 3 bits/s.
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